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ABSTRACT
UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION
IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS:
A CONTINGENCIES VIEW
1 September 1977
Peter Hess, B.S., Georgetown University
Ed*D.» University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Donald T. Streets
It is suggested that decision-making in public
higher eduoation, speolfloally In the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts, might most effectively be understood In terms of
mid-range or "contingencies" theory. Pour specific con-
tingencies propositions are considered i (1) that power Is
the oonsequenoe of control of strategic contingencies; (
2 )
that consensus from the task environment is
essential for
the functioning of domain; (3) that the network
form resists
change until It is necessitated by environmental
variation;
and (4) that the polity will attempt to
assure network In-
tegrity primarily by manipulation of the
network environment
Each of these Is found to adequately
comprehend the data
presented from Massachusetts public
higher education.
Finally, It is suggested that, to
the extent that
V.
planning-as-computation and plannlng-as-Judgement have be-
come Ineffective for increasingly complex social systems
such as public higher education, planning-as-enabling—as
social learning, institutional participation and consensus
building—represents a necessary and effective alternative.
/
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter
I. UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION
IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 1
II. CONTINGENCIES THEORY 26
III. MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION*
DATA TO THEORY ^
IV. THEORY TO PRACTICE
f
appendix
88
LIST OF REFERENCES
89
CHAPTER I
UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION
IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Like tiiany other institutions these days, higher
education has become the object of widespread skep-
ticism. After an era of unprecedented growth,
affluence and exalted status in the 1960s, it
stands very much on the defensive. No longer is it
assured of the unquestioning public regard and
financial support it once enjoyed. Increasingly,
doubts are being raised as to whether its benefits
are not outweighed by its costs and burdens.
Alan Pifer, President
The Carnegie Commission
Introduction
The general status of higher education
In America Is
demonstrably not what It was even Just
five years ago. This
dissertation Is Intended to deal with
the current status of
public higher education, specifically
in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts
•
To paraphrase a classic Marshall
McLuhan understate-
also helps in dealing with a
situation Is first
ment , what
2of all understanding It. Consequently, this dissertation
Is concerned primarily with the development of an under-
standing. A theory will be suggested to facilitate such an
understanding, but the adequacy of that theory Is not the
central Issue here. While some consideration will necess-
arily be given to the question of theoretical adequacy, the
focus of the present study will be on understanding devel-
opments in Massachusetts public higher education. Theory
will be emphasized as merely a means to that end.
The Problem
Public higher education in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts Is in trouble. Following more than a decade
of cqntinuous, rapid expansion, the demand for public higher
education has begun, not merely to level off, but unexpect-
edly to decline. For the third consecutive year enrollment
systemwide is down, this year by approximately 8 percent.
This despite the fact that the size of the pool of graduat-
ing high school seniors is still increasing, and is not ex-
pected to begin decreasing until early in the next decade.
And Just as alarming is the fact that enrollment at private
institutions of learning throughout the Commonwealth is down
only 1 percent. In other words, Massachusetts public
higher
education is attracting not only a progressively smaller
share of a still expanding potential market, but a
relatively
smaller share of the actual market as well.
There may be a
3complex of variables operating* but the undeniable fact is
that the market for Massachusetts public higher education
has become seriously "soft".
Nor has this faot been lost on the Governor, vfho
for the third consecutive year has proposed a budget funding
public higher education only at its current level, which is
to say, at the same level for which it was funded for
fiscal
year 1975. And not to be outdone, the State
Legislature has
for the past two years been considering
legislation to re-
organize public higher education to eliminate both
the
duplication of services and the increasing
competition for
funding among the various public institutions.
Thus, the
autonomy, and the very existence of some
of these institu-
tions, have begun to be . threatened as
a result of this
fact of diminishing demand.
And this fact has critical consequences,
not only
for those directly employed by public
higher education, but
for the eoonomy of the Commonwealth
in general. Higher
education is Massachusetts- largest
Industry, both in terms
of employment, and in terms of
the money which it intro-
duces less directly into the
state- s economy; and public
higher education constitutes the
largest sector of
industry. Also, the fixed costs
inherent in the enterprise
-
for pensions and debt service,
for example-do not vary with
enrollment. And to the extent
that current usage does
not
4generate Income sufficient to cover these obligations, the
burden of payment shifts to the general fund. In a state
which only recently has begun to recover some sense of fis-
cal Integrity, such a shift could be critical. Given Just
these two considerations, the current decline in demand for
public higher education in Massachusetts should be a source
of tremendous general concern.
The irresistible conclusion is that the system has
not been sufficiently planned; that for a variety of prob-
ably political reasons the development of public higher
education in the Commonwealth reflects more the grasping
of opportunties by professionals and politicians than it
does the careful consideration of longer-term trens. In
the presence of these suspicions it is probably futile to
note that, in fact, the single factor most responsible for
the current condition of public higher education—the
economy—has been wholly unpredict ible, and has probably
compounded whatever deficiencies in foresight the system
now evidences. The popular consensus is that Massachusetts
public higher education has been both over-built and under-
planned.
Regardless of the extent to which a lack of adequate
planning is actually responsible for the current condition
of public higher education in the Commonwealth, the question
arises as to whether or not adequate planning might
yez im-
5prove the capability of public higher education to success-
fully adjust to current and future variation in demand con-
ditions, Evaluation of that possibility begins in a con-
sideration of what planning is.
The possibility of planning
John Ruggie (1975) characterizes planning as "pro-
grammatic activity by those in authority, specifically, the
malting of choices other than those which the market would
produce, " Ruggie identifies two basic planning models: the
comprehensive, and the incremental.. Unfortunately, both
are felt to be essentially deficient.
Comprehensive planning
The defining attribute of the comprehensive planning
model is considered to be the specification of a positive
public "good". Public higher education would be the posi-
tive public good in the present study, and would therefore
become the "consummatory objective” of the comprehensive
plan. Ruggie (1975s P-130) continues:
Those factors and forces thought to have a positive
Impact upon the public good are supported, whll®
those seen to be detrimental are constrained. These
supports and constraints become the instrumental
objectives of the plan. And the performance of
this entire system is monitored and adjusted In
keeping with whatever success or failure Indicators
report
.
Comprehensive planning Is considered to be desirable
exactly
6because It purports to be comprehensive; that Is, It claims
to comprehend all relevant variables. Its deficiency is
said to inhere in the fact that such comprehension is con-
sidered by critics to be impossible where complex human sys-
tems are involved. According to critics, comprehensive
planning makes cognitive demands which exceed man’s limited
problem-solving capacities and Inherently limited brain
(Winner 1975). These critics Insist that complex social and
organizational systems must be simplified to be understood,
and that, because it fails even to attempt to do so, compre-
hensive planning simply cannot adequately comprehend such
systems. Further* it is argued that the prescriptions
generated in comprehensive planning are too often beyond
the existing political capacity to implement them. That
is,
what is identified in planning as desirable may in
fact be
unattainable as a practical matter. In short then,
the
criticism of comprehensive planning is that it is
impossible,
or Impractical, or both.
Incremental planning
In contrast to the comprehensive model,
Incremental
planning is said to be characterized
by a realization of the
limits of human understanding in
comprehending complex sys-
tems (Buggie 1975, P-132)«
Incrementalism begins not with a »^_°[8a0^“ta1
'
ity, but (rather) takes existing
reality as one
7alternative and compares the probable gains and
losses of closely related alternatives by making
relatively small adjustments in existing reality,
or by making larger adjustments about whose con-
sequences approximately as much is known as about
the consequences of existing reality, or both.
In addition to making marginal choices and re-
stricting the number of alternatives to be con-
sidered, the Incrementalist planner has a definite
strategy for simplification. He factors problems
into nearly independent parts and then deals with
these serially* The success of Incrementalism is
assured, it is believed, because the model simply
apes the manner in which deoislon-makers perceive
problems and make decisions. And should mistakes
be made, their destructive consequences are felt
to be minimized by the marginality of the change
effected.
The deficiencies Inherent in the incremental model
are said to be three-fold: (l) The targets of incremental
planning are the elements of relationships, when It is be-
coming increasingly evident that what is critical Is the
nature of the relationships themselves. (2) In the process
of abstracting for the purpose of simplification the
elements
of a complex system, there is the danger of Inappropriately
relating the elements In the model; that is, of building
Into the model a systematic misapprehension of the
complex
relations which exist In the actual system. And (3),
In-
cremental planning creates a spiraling demand for
Itself;
In changing only specific elements within
a system, incre-
mentalism triggers compensatory responses
elsewhere within
the system, which then require additional
Incremental adjust.
similarly responded to, and so on s*iments which will be
8Infinitum .
About the possibility of planning, Ruggie ( 1975 ,
p. 136 ) concludes:
We appear to confront a seemingly inescapable series
of paradoxes: in the complex modem societies, the
less foreseeable the future, the more is foresight
required; the less we understand, the more is in-
sight needed; the fewer the conditions which permit
planning, the greater the necessity to plan. Yet
the comprehensive model is too complex for our
simple minds and polities, and the incremental, too
simple for our oomplex societies. Hence, the
Himpossibility theorem*1 and the dilemma of whether
to attempt the seemingly impossible or do nothing at
all.
The imperative to understand
What is in fact impossible for an organized system is to
do nothing. Even in the possibility of the impossibility of
planning, such systems will at least respond to the changing
conditions within which they exist and operate. And as
James D. Thompson (1967) points out, such response is a
function not only of desired outcomes or goals, but of "be-
liefs about oause/effeot relations" or understanding as well.
In other words, even where understanding oan he
demonstrated
to be Inadequate for planning in the anticipatory
sense, what-
ever understanding which does exist will be in part
determine
the system's response to change. Thus, even
in the possi-
bility of the impossibility of planning the
necessity remains
to develop the most adequate understanding
possible to assure
the most appropriate possible organizational
response to
9change.
In this sense, then, the question of the posslbllltty
of planning Is Irrelevant; the necessity remains for the
organized system to understand Itself. And the Intent of
the present study remains the development of just such an
understanding, again, of public higher education In the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Minimally, this understand-
ing must be of the organized complexity which characterizes
that enterprise.
Understanding Complexity
Organized complexity
A system is considered to be "organized" when the
interactions or relations among its elements are intended
or purposeful rather than random (Weaver 1975 )* The "com-
plexity" of an organized system has been defined by LaPorte
(1975) 811(1 others as a function (1) of the number of
ele-
ments in a system, (2) of the relative differentiation or
variety of these elements, and (3) of degree of
inter-
dependence among these elements. Given these understandings,
there can be no question that Massachusetts public
higher
education is both organized and complex.
Organized complexity has generally been understood
to
be a consequence of the societal division
of labor (Wilson
1975). That is, the societal division of
labor Is generally
understood to be responsible for both the
relatively large
10
number of social elements or roles in the current society,
and the relatively high degree of both differentiation and
interdependeoe among these elements. Consequently, organized
complexity has traditionally been viewed as "coercive" rather
than "normative" That is, the relations within organized
complexity are usually understood to be determined by the
division of labor rather than being chosen by the members
of the society (Etzioni 1968). The understandings of
organized complexity, therefore, differ primarily on the
question of whether or not this inherent coercion is felt
to be beneficial to the society as a whole.
For Rousseau, for example, organized social com-
plexity destroyed the normative simplicity within which he
felt mankind emerged and prospered; the division of labor
only served to institutionalize individual differences in
sooial roles, thus causing alienation, and a fracturing of
what he termed the "general will". But Rousseau's is appar-
ently a minority view.
In contrast, the classical economic understanding
of organized complexity has been that it is the coercive
i.e., mechanical—nature of complexity whloh assures the
responsiveness of the market to significant aggregates of
demand. And for Adam Smith, It was the simple causal
re-
lations among the elements of the economy created
by the
division of labor which protects against tyranny
In the
11
marketplace. Thus the coeroive nature of organized complexity
Is viewed as economically beneficial to both the society and
the individual.
Similarly* the traditional political understanding of
organized complexity has been that It serves to deflect,
and
thus to render Indeterminate, direct political
actions. And
In that sense, such complexity Is felt to be a
safeguard
against political oppression. In fact, the
creation In the
U.S. Constitution of a system of checks and
balances reflects
the Madisonian conviction that a division
of power, while
coercive In Its determination of the
legislative process,
was nevertheless essential for the
protection of minority
rights and Individual freedoms from
the arbitrary exercise
of power by the polity (Wilson 1975)
•
Finally, the sociolglcal view of organized com-
plexity, according to Wilson (1975, P«292) , has
most often
been that It Is ". . .a protection against
disintegration,
indeed, Its negation, because It Implies
strengthening of
primary and secondary associations,
stratification and
interdependence .
In general, then, organized complexity
has not been
understood as a problem. While
admittedly coercive In Its
determination of societal relations. It
Is nevertheless
viewed as economically, politically
and sociologically
benlflcent for both society and
the Individual. In this
12
sense, organized complexity has more often been understood
as a "solution", than as a "problem". The current organiza-
tional understanding of organized complexity stands in marked
contrast to this tradition.
Before moving to an extended consideration of the
organizational understanding of organized complexity, how-
ever, it should be pointed out that the formal organization
is considered to be essentially different from organized
complexity in general. Wilson ( 1975* P*289) explains:
It is worth remembering that, in its premeditated
formal quality, the "division of labor" within an
organization is really qualitatively different
from the division of labor in society as a whole.
Differentiation and interdependence, and therefore
the qualitative character of complexity, are dif-
ferent in formal organizations from what they are
toSoiSy at large where the "informal" is pre-
dominant, because these organizations could have
no informal structure if the formal division of
labor were not present.
Despite this fact of essential difference between
organized
social complexity and formally organized
complexity, this
difference does not In Itself account for the
divergence of
the organizational understanding of
complexity from tra-
ditional economic, political and sociological
views.
commeTitVi t
-ft*
complex organization
"Organization" , In the sense Intended
here. Is a social
unit oriented primarily to the
attainment of specific goals
(Parsons 1951). Consequently, to the
extent that It deflects
cr confounds organizational action
In pursuit of such goals.
13
complexity constitutes a serious organizational problem.
And it the realization of this fact that increasingly has
come to determine the basic organizational understanding
of organized complexity.
Initially, however, consistent with the traditional
perspectives, the organization recognized complexity as
coercive, but not as a problem. And, as with the tra-
ditional economic and political views, the mechanistic
metaphor dominated this early understanding. "Equilibrium"
was the concept suggested to represent the optimal organi-
zational condition, and was defined as the consequence of
simple causal relations among organizational elements.
Frederick Taylor, for example, suggested that industrial
equilibrium would occur at the most efficient ratio between
workers' wages and output. From this perspective, if equi-
librium were disturbed, balance would be recoverable by
means of adjustments to prior causal elements. Consequently,
the crucial task for both theorists and managers became the
specification and operationalization of such internal causal
variables. And what emerged from this concern was a steady
flow of research on such primary intra-organizational
variables as size, work-flow, work demands, spatio-temporal-
physical factors, and heuristics; such mediating structural
variables as leadership, authority relations, authority
delegation and departmentalization; and such aspectslevels,
14
of control as reward, sanction, measuring Instruments and
standards (Melcher 1975)*
The continued dominance of this mechanistic metaphor
in organizational thought is demonstrated by the fact that,
even in to the late 1960s, when worker absenteeism distorted
input-output ratios in the highly automated American car
Industry, . -it was still widely felt that balance
(equilibrium) should be recoverable through adjustments in
monetary inducements alone” (Starling !975* p.156) • This
dominance finally diminished, but only as it has become
obvious that the condition of organizations is a function,
not only of causally related variables internal to formal
organizational boundaries, but of external or "environmental"
factors as well.
Even as recently as 10 years ago, it was still
possible to accept the hypothesis—generated from the
mechanistic perspective-that when the source of organiza-
tional problems was a function external to the
formal
boundaries of the organization, the organization
would
merely expand to absorb the critical
function. Thus, as
recently as 1967, It could reasonably be
reported that
sources of supply were generally expected
to be negotiated
by means of vertical Integration
(Galbraith 1967).
Events of the past decade, however,
have made It
increasingly clear that there are certain
functions which
15
are both external to the organization and yet critical to
Its functioning, and which simply cannot be absorbed, or
sometimes even reliably contracted. Control of energy
resources is an obvious example; consumer demand Is another.
The Inescapable fact Is that there are certain environmental
variables over which the organization Is unlikely ever to
exercise adequate control. With the realization that this
fact simply cannot be comprehended within the traditional
mechanistic perspective, has come also the suggestion that
a "systems" understanding of organized complexity might
therefore be more effective.
Systems understanding
According to von Bertalanffy (1968), a "system"
consists of "sets of elements standing in interaction."
Huse and Bowditch (1973* P-28) expand on this, defining
a system as
... a series of interrelated or interdependent
parts, such that the interaction or interplay of
any of the subsystems affects the whole. In fact,
the interactions and interdependencies among sub-
systems are recognized to be at least as important
as the individual elements or variables.
The advantage of the "systems" understanding, then, is
that
it recognizes the importance of the relations among
elements
in a system. Consequently, there is a shift in
both practi-
cal and analytic concern from understanding only
the ele-
ments of a system, to understanding the relations
among
16
elements.
The systems perspective assumes the existence of
general principles applying to, and describing all systems
irrespective of whether they are of a physical, biological
or sociological nature (Buckley 1967). (As will be noted
further on, the validity of this assumption is open to
question.) The language used to express these "general
principles" is that of the communications sciences. French
and Hall (1973* P«159)> for example, describe the organiza-
tion in systems terms as follows:
An organization starts with "input flows" from
sources in the external environment which then
are "transformed" by technical and/or human sub-
systems into "outputs" which are then provided
to users. In addition, most systems Include one
or more "feedback" mechanisms which process the
"signals" from the external or the internal en-
vironment indicating whether there is something
wrong with the "output" which might require
changes in the internal system, or in the "out-
puts", or both'.
In the systems understanding of organized complexity, then,
the external environment is realized to be affecting the
organization, specifically in the form of Information which
requires appropriate organizational response.
Homeostatic systems
The range of possible systems understandings is
bounded on the one end by the mechanistic balance model,
and on the other, by the genetlcally-determlned-growth model.
In a sense, then, although It Is not In fact an actual systems
17
analog, the mechanistic understanding of organized com-
plexity might reasonably be viewed as a "closed system"
perspective* And in the same sense, it might reasonably be
suggested that the shift in organizational and analytic con-
cern to an environmental focus necessitates merely a shift
from a "closed system" to an "open system" understanding
of organized complexity*
The particular "open system" understanding which has
come to replace the mechanistic model was derived from what
has been termed a "homeostatic" perspective. Starling (1975*
p. 159 ) explains:
Homeostatic systems concepts were abstracted from
biological equilibrium processes. The term homeo-
stasis" implies structure-maintaining processes
that are basically dynamic. 'These aut0
“
matically control deviation by monitors
receive "error messages" and in turn send back
corrective information • Such feedback processes
imply a unidirectional, usually linear,
cause
effect relationship between components:
in oreceedlng processing sequences are altered
to
dampen°devlanoe whenever It Is detected in an
effect
or output.
Thus the homeostatic system understandine
of organization
is still essentially mechanistic:
causation is still assumed
to be both simple and prior. The
superiority of the homeo-
static perspective, then, inheres
entirely in its recogni-
tion of the existence in
organizations of feedback processes,
and of the responsiveness of
organizations to environmental
variation
•
Criticism of the homeostatic
systems understanding
18
focuses on the fact that It Is a cybernetic—i.e., negative
feedback—model. Again according to Starling ( 3.975* p.163),
"because organizational processes are assumed to alter only
to dampen deviance, oybemetlc or negative feedback systems
contain no provision for deviation amplification for pur-
poses of adjustment." In other words, the homeostatic sys-
tem understanding of organization is essentially behavioral:
all organizational response is assumed to be merely re-
sponsive. This means that Internally initiated organizat-
ional change such as goal modification, for example, simply
cannot be accomodated within the homeostatic model; nor can
the Increasingly common organizational activity of attempt-
ing to anticipate—even to manipulate—market conditions.
Given this deficiency, what has been suggested by theorists
is a further shift, this time to an "adaptive" systems
understanding
.
Adaptive systems
Starling (1975* P*3.66) suggests that the critical
attribute of the "adaptive" system model is the recognition
of "morphogenic" or experience-storing processes
in the
organization. Thus,
Short-term or transitory organizational responses
Ire derived ?rom pre-existing or pre-deslgned
recog-
nition and response capabilities utilizing
pre-en
information regarding system parameters
More permanent adaptation, on the o h * . ro
quires that the system use its own prior
experience.
19
In the adaptive view, organizational structures and be-
havior are not understood in terms of mere response; they
are seen instead as emerging in the interaction between
the organization's morphogenic processes and the pressures
exerted by the organization's environment.
The other significant aspect of the adaptive model
is its realization that the set of structural and processual
relations whioh define the organization is dynamic. Con-
sequently, again according to Starling (1975» P«l69)>
Though an adaptive system may be loosely comprehended,
its precise state at any given moment cannot be deter-
mined. Therefore, the task of the organization shifts
from one of simplifying structure and production pro-
cesses, to one of simplifying the learning process to
discriminate among the myriad, ofetn redundant, sig-
nals being received.
For the adaptive system, then, the Immediate
concern Is not
to improve functional efficiency; the Immediate
concern Is
merely to understand what Information—which
"signals"
from the environment—might he critical for
operation.
Finally, In its recognition of the dynamic
nature
of the relations which define the
organization, the adaptive
systems analog recognizes the possibility
of the impossi-
bility of planning In the sense of
constructing conditions.
As Wilson (1975> P-325) notes,
The organization is /"fXpt^tS strive
hostlie”environment^ more than It
Is regarded
as regenerated organizing an Inchoate,
neutral environment.
20
For all of these reasons, then. It is the under-
standing provided by the adaptive systems analog which
seems most adequately to comprehend the actual experience
of the complex organization. However, there is consider-
able concern among both theorists and managers over the
difficulty In applying systems models in general. The
difficulty is felt to originate in the very generality of
systems concepts which was felt to be the strength of that
mode of understanding.
Criticism of the systems accroach
The key concepts in ageneral systems understanding
are suggested to include subsystems, wholism, system bound-
aries, negentropy, steady state, dynamic equilibrium, cy
bemetic process, internal elaboration, multiple goal-
seeking and equifinality, as a partial list (Kast and Rosen
-
zwelg 1972). Critics of the systems approach argue that,
when applied to the organized social field, these
concepts
are ambiguous rather than general, and that both
the cause
and the effect of that ambiguity has been the
isolation of
theory from actual experience. Blumer (19^9* P«29)
explains
These terms do not discriminate clearly their
empirical instances. At best they allow on y
rough identification, and in what is so
roughly
•i a -f*i Ad thev do not permit a determination
of w^t is'oovered by the concept and what Is
not.
Blumer then points out the practical
consequences of this
fact i
21
This ambiguous nature of concepts . . . hinders
us in coming to close grips with our empirical
world* for we are not sure what to grip. Our
uncertainty as to what we are referring obstructs
us from asking pertinent questions. The vague
sense dulls our perceptions and thus vitiates
directed empirical thought. It subjects our re-
flections on possible relations between concepts
to wide bands of error. It encourages our
theorizing to revolve in a separate world of its
own with only tenuous connection with the em-
pirical world. And it limits severely the clari-
fication and growth that concepts may derive from
findings of research.
Thus, to the extent that its concepts do in fact obstruct
the asking of pertinent questions, the general systems
approach precludes the very kind of understanding which
is essential for organizational survival according to the
adaptive analog.
Also, there is a sense in which general systems
theory is not a theory at all. According to George
Homans
( 1970, p. 60), sets of concepts such as those
specified in the
general systems approach constitute, not a theory,
but a
"con0eptual scheme "
:
e,
The important point here Is not
that general systems
, do not presently constitute a
theory of organized
concepts p:
social complexity . What is crucial,
according to the critics.
22
is the realization that, because of the ambiguous nature of
these concepts, at least in their application to the social
field, these concepts cannot presently be related by the
contingencies propositions which define a theory. Because
of their ambiguity, it is argued that general systems con-
cepts simply do not make contact with their empirical in-
stances sufficient to permit generation of the kinds of
propositions essential for a theory. Consequently, the
general systems models resist being brought into a close
and self -correcting relation with the empirical world so
that their proposals about that world can be tested, refined
and enriched by the data of that world (Blumer 1969). At
least In its current form, general systems theory
even in
its promising adaptive analog— seems not to be sufficiently
grounded to generate the kind of understanding
necessary to
assure appropriate organizational response
to experience.
Actually, the general systems approach
is merely
the most recent of what might be termed
"general theoretical
perspectives". In this sense, the systems
general theories
might be said to succeed the mechanistic
general theories.
The advantage of "general theories"
has been said by Parsons
(1959, P.89) to be that it ensures
"the kind of Integration
and directed activity which only the
availability and em-
ployment of a well-articulated and
general theoretical sys-
tem can give to a science."
Homans (1970) suggests that
23
the attraction of theorists to "general theory" Is a con-
sequence of their confusion of ends with means.
According to Homans, social theorists especially
tend to confuse the way a theory looks when it is fully
developed with the way a theory is arrived at:
Since a completed theory—and it is never more
than provisionally completed—works downward,
so to speak, from general propositions to less
general empirical ones, they feel that the
process of theory-building should work down-
ward too, starting from very general considera-
tions and hoping eventually to reach the data
(1970, p.60).
While Homans does not rule out the possibility that sound
social or organizational theory might yet be developed by
means of the downward-moving strategy, he does suggest what
he feels would be a more appropriate approach, given the
current stage of development of the social sciences:
This strategy starts with the empirical findings
themselves, and seeks to invent the more general
propositions from which these same findings, and,
under different conditions, other findings may be
derived.
Theory developed by means of this strategy has been
termed
"theory of the middle range" or "contingencies theory".
The "middle range" approach
Kast and Rosenzweig (1972, p.463) summarize the
support for middle-range or contingencies
theory:
The general tenor of the contingency view is
some-
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modem organizations but uses patterns of re-
lationships and/or configurations of subsystems
in order to facilitate improved practice.
Management is seen as increasingly relying on a
reasonable success rate for actions in a proba-
bilistic environment.
Anant Negandhi (1975* P-118) concurs:
Until general systems concepts are further de-
veloped and operationalized, the mid-range
approach—contingencies theory—provides perhaps
the most realistic means of still utilizing some
of the salient features of the systems approach
in understanding complex organization.
Accepting the validity of the criticism of the general
systems concepts, this study will concern itself in Chapter
2 with an extended consideration of contingencies theory.
Hecapitulation
As was stated in the Introduction, the purpose of
this dissertation is to develop an understanding
of Public
higher education, specifically in the Commonwealth
of Massa-
chusetts. It was suggested that such an
understanding is
critical, if not for planning in the anticipatory
sense,
then at least to assure the most
appropriate response possi
ble by public higher education to changes
in the conditions
within whloh it exists and operates.
It was also suggested that, minimally,
this under
standing must be of the organised
complexity which charact-
erizes that enterprise. A brief
review of the traditional
economic, political and sociological
perspectives revealed
that, while organized complexity
has generally been recog-
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nized as coercive, it has nevertheless been vievied more
as a solution than a problem. That is, the complex of
relations created by the societal division of labor has
generally been understood to be beneficial to both the
individual and society* However, it was suggested that
for goal-oriented enterprises such as public higher educa-
tion, because it deflects and confounds actions in pursuit
of such goals, organized complexity represents a serious
problem, and therefore the traditional understandings do not
obtain.
The course of development of the organizational
understanding of organized complexity was then reviewed,
from the early mechanistic metaphor to the current systems
analogs. These last were found to be unacceptable because
the ambiguity of their concepts renders them Impractical.
It was then found that what has been suggested
as
an alternative to the systems models is the
middle-range
or contingencies approach which attempts to
generate the
more general propositions from the data of
experience. To
understand that particular instance of organized
complexity
which is Massachusetts public higher
education, we therefore
turn to a consideration of contingencies
theory.
CHARTER II
CONTINGENCIES THEORY
Although presented some 10 years ago, James D.
Thompson's Organ1zat ions In Action ( 1967 ) Is still generally
considered to be the best available synthesis of middle-
range theory on complex organization (Rushing and Zald 1976).
Thompson Intended merely to develop a "conceptual Inventory"
of the field, but what emerges Instead Is a well-developed
system of contingency propositions—a theory. In briefest
summary, Thompson's view of the complex organization is
based on the following assumptions:
The organization contains more variables than we
can comprehend at one time, some subject to In-
fluences we cannot control or predict ....
(Also), parts and their relationships are deter-
mined through evolutionary processes ....
Thus we conceive of complex organizations as open
systems, hence indeterminate and faced with un-
certainty, but at the same time, as subject to
criteria of rationality and henoe needing deter-
minateness and certainty (1967 jP*10).
For Thompson, the essential fact about complex
organizations
is the existence within them of the critical tension
between
the reality of uncertainty, and the continuing need
for
rationality. For Thompson, organizational "actions"
are a
function of this tension.
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Rationality and uncertainty
As was noted earlier, Thompson suggests that organi-
zational actions are rooted both in "desired outcomes" or
goals, and In "beliefs about oause/effect relations" or
understanding. The extent to which this understanding
assures the organization of the attainment of its goals is
what is meant by "rationality" (Thompson 1967)* Thus,
rationality is a function, not only of the understanding of
the cause/effect relations relevant to goal attainment, but
also of the control of the organization over such relations.
Understanding alone is viewed as insufficient to assure
goal attainment. "Perfect rationality" requires both a
complete understanding of, and complete control over,
critical cause/effect relations.
Thompson (1967) defines three levels of rationality:
technical, organizational and institutional. Only the first
two levels, technical and organizational, are of concern
here.
According to Thompson (1967)* "technical rationality
Is concerned with understanding and controlling cause/effect
relations internal to the organization, including the
organizational technology Itself, and the lntra-organizatlonal
variables noted in Chapter One. As a result of the
fact that
for more than fifty years such variables were
the single
foous of both theoretical and practical
concern, these factors
28
are generally felt to be both adequately understood and
sufficiently controlled to assure a relatively high level
technical rationality.
"Organizational rationality", on the other hand, is
concerned not only with technical rationality, but with
cause/effect relations external to the organization’s
boundaries, in what is therefore the organizational environ-
ment. Thompson (196?) suggests that as complexity in the
environment increases, organizational understanding of the
environment becomes less certain, and organizational ra-
tionality to that extent becomes "bounded".
Uncertainty and "bounded rationality"
It might be remembered that in an open system the
environment is experienced as information. In this sense,
uncertainty might therefore be considered to be a quality
of understanding when the nature, flow and/or complexity
of information from the environment exceed the capacity
of
the organization to accurately process it. Thus,
increasing
environmental complexity, to the extent that it exceeds
the
capacity of the organization to process it,
generates in-
creased uncertainty or diminished understanding
which, to
that extent, "bounds" or limits organizational
rationality,
and with it, the assurance of goal attainment.
The effects of bounded rationality
are very real.
As Galbraith C 1967 ) notes, business
In a complex economy Is
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"• • • mostly contract negotiation." Contracting, however,
requires exactly the kinds of assurance of performance per-
formance or goal attainment which only a relatively high
degree of organizational rationality can provide. Conse-
quently, to the extent that environmental complexity bounds
or limits organizational rationality, assurances about per-
formance must be qualified, making contract negotiation
that much more difficult, and thus threatening the very
existence of the organization.
If the environment is the source of the uncertainty
which so seriously threatens the organization, the obvious
solution would seem to be to close the organization to the
environment. In the mid-range understanding of complex
organization, this is clearly not possible.
The Complex Organization
Domain and consensus
According to Thompson (1967b organizations necess-
arily occupy social space within their environment. This
"space" constitutes the "domain" of the organization, which,
according to Levine and White (1961), is determined by the
claims made by the organization concerning what product or
service it seeks to provide, and for what population or
market. In a sense, then, in making claims about what
func-
tion it will perform, and for whom, the organization
selects
the points at which it will make contact with the
environment;
but only In a limited sense. As Thompson ( 1967 , p.28)
points out, domain Is consensual.
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The establishment of domain cannot be an arbitrary
unilateral action. Only if the organization's
claims to domain are recognized by those who can
provide the netcessary support can a domain be
operational. Only if the organization is judged
by those in contact with it as offering something
desirable will it receive the inputs necessary for
survival.
From this perspective, therefore, it is impossible for, the
organization to be other than open to the environment: the
organization does not merely exist within an environment,
it depends upon the environment within it exists for valida-
tion of its domain—for "domain consensus"—which is essen-
tial, not only for acquiring necessary inputs, but for
output disposal as well. The form of validation or consensus
is described in terms of "exchange".
Exchange and the task environment
In the mid-range understanding, the concept of
"exchange" is used to represent any of the full range of
relations and interactions between the organization and the
elements of its environment- (Levine and White 1961). Ana-
lytic focus, however, is on those exchanges which
are sig-
nificant for the realization of organizational
goals.
The assumption underlying exchange theory
is that
each party to a potential exchange has something
which the
other party needs (Clegg 1975). What is
exchanged, there-
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fore* are "resources". In the mid-range understanding,
the concept of resources refers not only to materials, but
to personnel, clients. Information, Influence and capital,
as veil* The concept of exchange merely recognizes that
both the organization and the various elements of its
environment control resources which the other needs, and
that the satisfaction of the needs of both can most effect-
ively be achieved by an exchange process. Exchange is the
form of domain consensus or validation in the sense that,
to the extent that the environment engages in exchange with
a given organization, the claims by that organization con-
cerning the social space which it seeks to occupy are con-
sensually validated.
The term "environment", however, is residual; it
refers potentially to everything which is not the organiza-
tion. Thompson (1967) suggests the concept of "task en-
vironment" to more accurately represent the focus of
organizational concern.
The concept of "task environment" is defined by
Dill (1958) as referring to those elements of the environ-
ment which are ". • . relevant, or potentially relevant,
for
goal-setting and/or achievement." In this sense, task en-
vironment Is similar to "organization set" which Evan
(1966)
describes as referring only to those parts of the
environ-
ment which significantly affect resource allocation
or
.
Prom this perspective, task environment
re-
distribution
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fers to, among other things, suppliers of resources,
customers and/or clients, competitors, and regulatory
groups such as government agencies, unions and Interorgani-
zational groups and associations.
In the mid-range or contingencies understanding,
then, the organization is not indiscriminately dependent
upon everything which is outside its formal boundaries.
The organization is seen as dependent only upon its task
environment , l.e., upon those elements in the environment
which can significantly affect either goal -setting and/or
achievement, or resource allocation and distribution.
Thus, it is only within its task environment that the
organization must achieve domain consensus or validation i
it is only with the elements of its task environment that
the organization must engage in exchange.
However, because organizational control over these
critical exchanges is never complete, the dependency of
the
organization upon even these specific environmental
elements
introduces both constraints and contingencies to
the organi-
zation. Thompson ( 19^7 * P«24) explains:
When the organization is opened to environmental
influences, some of the factors involved in.
organizational actions become "constraints , for
some meaningful period of time
variables, but fixed conditions to which the
organization must adapt. Some of the fac ors^
"contingencies'* which may or may not v y,
are not subject to arbitrary control by the
organization
•
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It is in the constraints and contingencies to which it opens
the organization, that the dependency of the organization on
its task environment introduces the uncertainty which bounds
rationality. Consequently, according to the mid-range
understanding, to minimize contingencies and therefore
maximize rationality the organization is expected to be
primarily concerned with the management of its dependency.
The management of dependency
The mid-range or contingencies understanding of
dependency is described by Emerson (1962, p*33)s
An organization is dependent upon some element of
its task environment (l) in proportion to the need
of the organization for resources or performances
which the element provides, and (2) in inverse
proportion to the ability of other elements to
provide the same resource or performance.
Power is considered to be the obverse of dependence, i.e.,
a function both of control over resources needed in the
environment, and the degree of control over such resources.
Thus, both dependency and power are felt to vary not only
with the locus of control over needed resources, but also
with the concentration or dispersion of that control. For
Thompson (1967, p.32), this is a most effective understand-
ing of these two concepts:
The power -dependency concept advanced here pro-
vides an important escape from the "zero-sum”
concept of power which assumes that, in a system
composed of A and B, the power of A is power a
the expense of B. By considering power in the
context of interdependence, we admit the possi-
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bllity of A and B becoming increasingly powerful
with regard to each other—the possibility that
increasing interdependence may result in a net
increase in power for both. It is upon this
possibility that coalitions rest.
From this perspective, then, even a position of relatively
high power in relation to a given environmental element does
not necessarily reduce organizational dependence on that
element. Thus the primary task of the organization is still
expected to be the management of its dependence.
Management strategies
The strategies available to the organization for the
management of its dependency are described by Thompson ( 1967 )
.
To the maximum extent possible, the organization is
expected to avoid dependency by attempting to "seal off" or
at least "buffer" its core technology from environmental
variation. Where resource acquisition and/or product dis-
posal or distribution represent unacceptable contingencies
in terms of input and output processing, for
example, it is
expected that the organization will attempt to
expand its
boundaries to absorb these functions. In fact,
this is
exactly what happens in vertical integration.
Alternatively, it is suggested that the
organization
might also manage or modify dependency
relations by changing
It goals. Because a change In
goals by the organization
constitutes a change In the domain being
claimed, such a
change also Involves a change In
the organization's task
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environment, and consequently, a change in dependency re-
lations as well.
Finally, competition is also suggested as a possible
strategy for the management of dependency. But competition
is more accurately a means to increasing power by increasing
control within a given market, and as was noted above, in-
creased power does not necessarily assure decreased dependence.
In fact, each of these strategies—boundary expansion,
goal changing and competition—is seen as too costly for the
organization to pursue, or as precluded by the nature of the
core technology to which the organization is committed.
Consequently, it is expected that complex organizations
will most often attempt to manage dependency by formalizing
contingencies utilizing essentially cooperative strategies.
Cooperative strategies
Thompson (196?, p.3*0 explains the basis for the
cooperative relation:
Using cooperation to gain power with respect to
some element of the task environment, the organi-
zation must demonstrate its capacity to reduce
uncertainty for that element, and must make a
commitment to exchange that capacity.
Paradoxically, the most effective means of managing
dependency
is considered to be the formalization of that
dependency re-
lation. Thus cooperation is expected to be
formalized in
one or a combination of three forms: (1)
"contracting", or
agreement for the exchange of per-the negotiation of an
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formances in the future; (2) "co-opting" , or the process of
absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-making
structure as a means of averting threats to organizational
stability; and (3) "coalescing", which Involves a combina-
tion or joint venture with another organization in the
task environment (Thompson 1967)*
That cooperation is, in fact the preferred strategy
in the management of organizational dependency is supported
by Galbraith's remark (196?) noted earlier, that "Business,
it can now be said with only slight exageration, is mostly
contract negotiation." And Thompson (1974) himself
documents the recent increase of literature describing the
general trend toward "sets of organizations which together
account for results." For Thompson, this trend requires
expansion of the mid-range focus to include "interorganiza-
tional" or "network" phenomena.
The Intel-organizational Network
Thompson ( 1974» P*3) suggests that the interorgani-
zational form emerges as a consequence of .
.the desire
on the part of the organization for results
requiring more
coordination than is possible In simpler
organizational
forms." In this respect, the emergence of
the interorganl-
zational network confirms Thompson’s
hypothesis (1967) that
increased lnterorganizatlonal dependence
Is expected to re-
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suit In a net Increase In power among the cooperating
organizations. Unfortunately, James Thompson died before
he could develop further a mid-range understanding of
the interorganizational network. However, such an under-
standing has been developed in what is termed "strategic
contingencies" theory.
A "strategic contingencies" understanding
According to Clegg (1975. P-W, the term "strategic
contingencies" refers to the fact that, in a network of
organizations, "... sub-units can be seen to be exchanging
control of strategic contingencies," in order to acquire
power through the exchange.
The interorganizational network
Hickson (1971. P-219) suggests that the Interorgani-
zational network, like the Individual organization,
"...
deals with environmentally derived uncertainties
in the
sources and composition of inputs, in the processing
of
through-puts, and again, in the disposal of
outputs. The
reduction of these uncertainties is seen to
be the work of
the network sub-units, and this "reduction
work" is under-
stood as what is exchanged within the
network (Clegg 1975)-
Thus the network is viewed as an open
system of cooperating
organizations whose primary function within
the network is
"coping" with some aspect of the
uncertainty which confronts
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the network in the pursuit of its goals.
From this perspective* each cooperating organization
is recognized as having power to the extent that it controls
some contingency which bounds network rationality. Unlike
the individual organization, power in the network is dispersed
throughout the netwok. Consequently, in the contingencies
understanding, it is expected that, to survive, the inter-
organizational network will be concerned primarily with
limiting the power of each of the cooperating organizations,
and with encouraging the use of differential power to func-
tion within the network rather than to destroy it (Hickson
1971* p.219)* For the interorganizational network, then,
the primary task is understood to be the maintenance of the
stability of the network power infrastructure. Consequently,
the focus of network concerns is expeoted to be on the co-
efficients of power of the cooperating network organizations.
Power and the network organization
In the strategic contingencies view, the power of
the individual network organization is defined as a function
(l) of interorganizational relations, or of its relations
with the other cooperating network organizations; and (2)
of network-environment relations (Hickson 1971* p»217)*
That is, the power of any given network organization is a
function not only of the control which it exercises within
the network, but also of the degree to which that
control
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is essential to the network in its relations with the en-
vironment.
Because maintenance of the stability of the network
power infrastructure is considered to be the primary concern
of the network, any variation in that infrastructure Is
assumed to be the consequence of changes in the environment.
That is, changes in the network* s power infrastructure is
described in tenns of network adaptation to changed or
changing environmental conditions. And any change in the
experience of power by a given network organization is ex-
pected to be the consequence of that organization facilitat-
ing network adaptation to environmental change. It is in
this sense that the power of any given network organization
is considered to be a function both of interorganizational
relations, and of the network's relations with its task
environment.
Changing the network power Infrastructure
Despite the fact that change in the network infra-
structure is expected to be the consequence of change in the
environment, the strategic contingencies understanding is
not exclusively behaviorist; the network is not viewed as
being merely responsive to the environment. In fact, to
describe the interorganizational network in strictly
behavioral
terms would be to misapprehend the range of alternative
actions
available to the network form. The Organization
of Petroleum
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Exporting Countries (OPEC), for example has dramatically
proven that the interorganlzatlonal network is capable of
purposeslve action which simply cannot be comprehended
from a strictly behavlorist position. In recognition of
this fact, the contingencies model views the network as
capable of the same range of purposive action as the Indi-
vidual organization; of changing goals, for example, and
In the sense explained earlier, of therefore selecting the
environment to which it will respond.
However, because a change In network goals necess-
arily implies realignment of the network power infrastructure;
and because the stability of that infrastructure is consideered
to be the primary concern of the network, internally initiated
network change is viewed as unlikely unless it originates
with the coalition dominating network decision-making. Con-
sequently, while the possibility of internally initiated
network change is recognized in the contingencies perspec-
tive, the focus of network concern is expected to be on
the
environment as the probable source of the variation which
can threaten infrastructural stability.
The possibility of environment -effected network
change is also of conoem to the individual network
organi-
zations. Since internally-initiated network change
is un-
likely for the reasons considered above, it is
expected that
network organizations seeking to modify the
existing power
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infrastructure will attempt to do so by indirect means, or
more specifically, by manipulation of the network environment.
This strategy is described by Thompson (1974, p.14) as
"manipulated field control", which is deliberate action on
the field of the environment of the network in order to
necessitate a definite response by the network, by manipula-
ting conditions in the environment. Because the power of
any given network organization is in part a function of the
criticality of the contingency which it controls for the
network, it is expected that the network organization will
attempt to improve its power position within the network
by manipulating conditions in the network environment to
increase the criticality of the control which it exercises.
The fact that some degree of environmental manipu-
lation is open to most organizations has been documented by
James Child (1969). And Bensen (1975) suggests the follow-
ing dimensions of environmental variation as potential tar-
gets for manipulations (1) resource concentration/dispersion,
or the extent to which control over resources resides in one
or many participants in the environment; (2) power concen-
tration/dispersion, or the extent to which some participants
in the environment dominate others; (3) network autonomy/
dependence, or the extent to which the network is dependent
upon its task environment; (4) environmental
dominance, or
the locus of power in the environment, (e.g.,
bureaucracy
vs. the public); (5) resource abundance/
scarcity, or the
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amount of resources In the environment which are available
for exchange; and (6) the mechanism of control in the en-
vironment! (i.e., ranging from active to passive). Obvi-
ously! some dimensions of variation are more open to organi-
zational manipulation than others. Still, in general, the
environment is viewed as open to the organizations with
which it is engaged in exchange. Even the mechanism of
control, for example, which is essentially determined by
the relevant polity, is seen as to some degree negotiable.
Thompson (1974) however, suggests that as the network form
proliferates, the role of the polity in determining the
mechanism of control in the various network environments is
increasingly significant.
The network and the polity
Thompson (1974) points out theat, because power in
the network is diffuse, decision-making takes the form of
bargaining or negotiation. And it is because negotiation
and bargaining involve future performances by at least one
party to the transaction that interorganizational networks
require the relatively stable or enduring infrastructures
discussed above. For Thompson (1974, p.20), it is the
func-
tion of the polity to assure the necessary stability:
A major role of the polity (in regard to Inter-
organizational networks), is to provide and stabilize
an
£
infrastructure which permits the ^ar^s ^each
zations involved to have confidence—if not In
eac *
o?her“then at least In the system. One
organization
43
is not likely to provide present performances
for another’s obligation unless it has confidence,
not only in the ability of the other to perform
properly in the future, but also in its willing-
ness or the system’s intention to enforce the
contract. Still more important, however, is the
confidence in the equitability (of what is ex-
changed) at two points in time—confidence that
the relative values of the performances will
remain comparable.
For Thompson, then, the existence of interorganizational
networks depends to a considerable degree on a polity capable
of maintaining both a stable economy, and a legal structure
sufficient to compel conformity to contracts.
In the contingencies understanding, it is expected
that the polity will function to assure network stability,
not by direct Intervention in network decisions, but by less
direct means, including for example, manipulated field con-
trol. In support of this hypothesis, Thompson offers the
the situation of the Federal Reserve Board attempting to con
trol inflation, not by limiting the supply of available
money, but by regulating the terms on which money is avail-
able. Such indirect methods are preferable, according
to
Thompson (197^> p.20), because
Unlike bargaining, which pits "big government"
against smaller organizations, or hierarchical
command which Is often resented by those
to it, and also runs the risk of compounded
error
when conditions become complex, indirect
manage-
ment of Infrastructures leaves decision-making
In
the hands of the organizations potentially in
volve^ Each organization is thus free to
assess
the affects of changes for Its own
configuration.
and the network organization, then,
are ex-
Both the polity
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peoted in the contingencies view to seek to modify network
behavior primarily by manipulation of the network environ-
envlronment
. For the lnterorganlzational network
,
as for
the individual organization, therefore, what is critical is
the control of strategic contingencies existing in the task
environment
•
Recapitulation
What the contingencies understanding of organization
suggests might be summarized in this way: (1) Organizational
action—i.e., decisions—are seen as rooted both in desired
outcomes or goals, and in rationality or understanding and
control of cause/effect relations critical to the organization.
(2) Because the organization is dependent upon its task en-
vironment for essential resources, however, the rationality
of the organization is described as bounded or limited, and
with it, the assurance of goal attainment which is crucial
in the current negotiated economy. (3) Consequently, the
organization is expected to be primarily concerned with the
management of dependency to limit its effects on rationality,
and with the management of the constraints and contingencies
Introduced by the fact of dependency. (4) While a number
of
strategies for the management of dependency are felt
to be
possible for the organization, it is expected that the
most
probable strategies will be those involving
interorganiza-
tlonal cooperation or negotiated formalization
of dependencies.
The network form is felt to be a manifestation of this
probability,
(5) The interorgan izational network is described as
a consequence of a common desire for more formal, and there-
fore more effective, coordination than is possible with
simpler organizational forms, (6) Like the individual organi-
zation, the interorganizational network is assumed to be
bounded or limited in terms of rationality, and therefore
is expected to be similarly concerned with the management of
dependency and the contingencies which it includes. (7) Be-
cause power in the network is diffuse, however, unlike the
individual organization, the interorganizational network
must be concerned with significant contingencies internal
to its boundaries, i.e., with maintaining the stability of
the network power infrastructure, (8) Consequently, the
network is expected to be primarily concerned with managing
the use of differential power to function within the network
to maintain assurance of goal attainment. In short, the
central organizational concern of the network is expected
to be maintenance of the stability of intra-network relations
(9) Since infrastructural stability is, in this sense
the immediate purpose of the network, it is expected that
network change will most often be only in response to
en-
vironmental variation. (10) Intentional network change,
therefore, is expected to be effected primarily
by meariS
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manipulated field control, or the manipulation of the net-
work environment. (11) It is expected that the polity espe-
cially will utilize manipulation of the environment in its
increasingly important function of assuring network infra-
structures.
Theory to Data
The critical question for the present study is this:
Is the contingencies understanding of organization adequate
to comprehend public higher education in the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts? Response to this question requires appli-
cation of the contingencies propositions to Massachusetts
public higher education. The adequacy of specifically four
fundamental contingencies propositions will be considered
in Chapter 3: (l) that domain consensus is
essential for
organizational survival; (2) that power is a consequence
of
control of strategic contingencies; (3) that
change in net-
work behavior will be resisted until
necessitated by signi-
ficant environmental variation; and (4)
that the polity
will utilize essentially indirect means
to effect modifica-
tion of network behavior. The task
now becomes one of
confronting these propositions with data
from the field.
CHAPTER III
MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION:
DATA TO THEORY
Decisions of resource adequacy
In a publio servioe enterprise such as public
higher education it is expected that decisions will most
often involve considerations (1) of the delivery of services,
and (2) of the acquisition and defense of adequate resources
(Bensen 1975). However, since resource adequacy Is assumed
to determine the level of performance In the delivery of
services (Yuchtman and Seashore 1967), it Is suggested that
the critical decisions In such an enterprise are
those In-
volving resource adequacy. Consequently, the data
to be
considered here will be that generated In response
to ques-
tions of resource adequacy. And since sufficient
funding Is
generally considered to be the resource most
essential for
a public service enterprise, what will
be the focus of these
considerations will be that nexus of organization
Involved
in determining, specifically, financial
resource adequacy
for public higher education In the
Commonwealth. It seems
reasonable to suggest that Involvement
In the funding pro-
cess is established by the mandated
budgetary process. That
process Is summarized In Figure 1,
below.
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This process might then be condensed to the following
form (Glenny .1975)
*
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Segmental budget BHE review Legislative Governor’s
preparation and and review and signature or
submission analysis appropriation line-item veto
k. k k k
Thus the public elements formally involved in the determina-
tion of fiscal adequacy for public higher education in
Massachusetts inolude (l) the segment-level Boards of
Trustees* (2) the Board of Higher Education (BHE) as the
statewide review agency* (3) the State Legislature* and (4)
the Executive. Because these elements exercise differential
power within the budgetary prooess, they together can be
considered to constitute an interorganizational network.
Consequently, analytic focus in the present study will be
at the network level. That is, what will be considered
here is the adequacy of the specified contingencies
propo-
sltlons in comprehending the Interorganizational
network
responsible for fiscal adequacy In Massachusetts
public
higher education.
This is not to suggest, however, that the subject of
analysis here will be those network decisions determining
fiscal adequacy In Massachusetts public higher
education;
what is being suggested Is that, as a test
of minimal adequacy,
the specified contlngnecles propositions
should be able to
clearly comprehend decisions by that
network In general.
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We turn now to an evaluation of those propositions.
Theory
The first proposition
Consideration of the first specified contingencies
proposition—that power is the consequence of the control
of strategic contingencies—requires specification of the
contingencies controlled by each element of the network
mandated by the budgetary process. In this regard, the
legislature might reasonably be understood to control the
actual appropriation function upon which the budgetary
process is significantly contingent; the executive, to con-
trol the enactment or allocation function; the segmental
boards of trustees, to control the budget preparation func-
tion; and the BEE, to control only a process of review and
non-binding recommendation*
In the contingencies understanding, each of these
elements would be expected to experience and exercise power
within the network in direct proportion to the criticality
of the contingency over which it exercises control. Thus,
for example, because it controls only a review function
which is demonstrably non-critical in budgeting public
higher education, the BHE would not be expected to
experience
or exercise significant power within the decision-making
network. Data testing these expectations will be
presented
following the introduction and expansion of the
other spec!-
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fled contingencies propositions*
The second proposition
Consideration of the second specified proposition—
that consensus Is essential for the survival of domain—
requires, first of all, specification of the domain of the
enterprise being analyzed. For public higher education,
the domain is, quite simply, public higher education. That
Is, the service offered is higher education; and the target
market or population is the general public. The fact that
this domain is, in a sense, mandated rather than claimed,
does not in any way diminish the validity of the concept
in defining the statement of the network goal; nor would
the fact of a mandated domain be expected to eliminate the
dependency of the network upon its task environment for
domain consensus. In other words, unless the adequate
funding assured by the mandated budgetary process Is
suffi-
cient to assure the adequacy of other essential
resources,
the network would still be expected to be dependent
upon
specific elements of its environment for these
resources.
In fact, adequate funding alone is not
sufficient
to assure an adequate supply of all other
resources.
Events of the past fe« years have made it
unarguable that
public support, client support and professional
staff sup-
port are absolutely essential for the
success of the public
higher education enterprise, and yet
these cannot be assured
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merely by adequate funding* Consequently, public higher
eduoation would be expected to be required to engage In ex-
change for adequacy in these non-fiscal resources. Exchange
would be expected to be with the specific locus of control
for each of these resources*
Control of both client support and public support
might perhaps be most accurately described as non-localized,
which is to suggest only that the avallablity of these re-
sources is a function of conditions existing in the general
public* Control of professional support, however, is in-
creasingly localized or concentrated in professional bar-
gaining groups, including specifically, the Massachusetts
Society of Professors (MSP), the American Association of
University Professors (AAUP), and the Massachusetts Teachers
Association (MTA) • To achieve the consensus necessary to
achieve full resource adequacy, therefore, it is expected
that public higher education will be required to engage in
exchange across its formal boundaries with both the general
public and the professional bargaining groups.
If, still recognizing the different function of
each within the deolslon-maklng process, the
legislature and
the executive might nevertheless be considered
together to
constitute the state "polity", Figure 3, below,
represents
the range of exchange relations which would
be expected to
be essential for domain consensus-or full
resource adequacy
for public higher education*
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THE
Fig* 3 Exchanges in. the Consensus Assuring Public Higher Education
Resource Adequacy
To the extent that these elements beyond the formal network
boundaries significantly affeot the allocation and/or distri-
bution of resources within the network » the general public
and the professional bargaining associations constitute,
by contingencies definition, significant elements of what
is therefore the network task environment.
The extent to which Figure 3 is ^ accurate repre-
sentation—that is, the extent to which public higher edu-
cation is, in fact, dependent upon its task environment
for
the consensus necessary for survival—will be
evaluated in
terms of the following data. What will also
be determined
in this process is the adequacy of the other
two specified
contingencies propositions, both Involving
the network and
change.
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Data
The data selected for consideration here describes a
reoent series of related decisions by the network described
above* These particular decisions were selected as data
specifically for the purpose of evaluating the contingencies
propositions in question. The decisions do not themselves
directly involve determinations of resource adequacy, but
were selected because they involve the network whose elements
would be expected to exercise and experience power in the
decision-making process as a consequence of their mandated
functions in the determination of resource adequacy.
natnand and public higher education
The national and local economic conditions during
the years 1974-1976 is common knowledge. For public higher
education, the crucial consequence of this condition has
been that, as unemployment has increased and remained rela-
tively high, the advantage of a post-secondary education
in
securing employment has diminished. As a result of
the
realization of this fact—and of the effect of the attendant
inflation on the cost of higher education—demand
for public
higher education has diminished, this year
(1976-??) to the
point where enrollment system-wide in
Massachusetts is down
approximately 8 percent.
The response of the network responsible
for deter-
mining fiscal adequacy for Massachusetts
public higher
54
education has been radical* After determining a budget for
the state system for PY 1975 which represented an Increase
of some 12.6 percent over the previous year» and despite a
significantly higher rate of inflation over that period,
the network determined a total budget increase for public
higher education of only 7.2 percent for the next two years
combined . But of no less significance is the fact that,
at this time* the network also began serious consideration
of reorganizing public higher education in the Commonwealth.
Reorganization
Legislation to reorganize Massachusetts public
higher education was scheduled to be Introduced by the
President of the State Senate on 1 April 1976. On March
31 the executive’s version of a reorganization bill was
released from the governor's office.
The legislation submitted by the executive (H-4623
)
was entitled * An Act to Improve Statewide Oversight, Co-
ordination and Planning for Public Higher Education and
for Private Postseoondary Affairs and to Provide
for the
Development of Alternative Plans for Reorganization
of the
Govemanoe System of Public Higher Education."
The stated
intent of the governor’s proposal was
contained In the
statement prefacing the bill:
The goal of that reform Is to eliminate
duplication
and fssume better coordination among
thevarlous
^rts of the system. The system now lacks
reliable
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means to give proper direction and cohesion to
the state v s higher education investments and pro-
grams. Taxpayers, students and the higher educa-
tion institutions are the losers. Without a
capacity to relate budgetary and program require-
ments to the needs of the Commonwealth and its
fiscal realities, public higher education will
begin to suffer an erosion of public support and
fail to fulfill its high promise of excellence.
A perhaps more direct statement of the intent of H-4623 is
contained in a statement from a "Draft for Discussion Pur-
poses Only" (Parks 19?6) circulated previous to the actual
release of the bill, and suggesting that what was sought
by the executive was to ". • • strengthen the authority and
capability to exercise central oversight over budgets, plan-
ning and programs that affect the total higher education
system."
The Senate Presidents reorganization bill (S-1371),
and another version originating with the BHE (H-4482 ) , were
subsequently submitted to the legislature with substantially
the same stated intent as the governor's bill, i.e., reform
of the system of governance of Massachusetts publio higher
education. In contingencies terms, the Intent of all three
bills might be described as the creation of a planning
capability to buffer the decision-making network from the
effects of subsequent environmental variation. And just as
all three reform paokages shared the a common stated
intent,
the proposed means to that end is also substantially
the
same in all three bills! creation of a strong,
centralized,
statewide coordinating agency.
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Consistent with Its own agenda, the BHE sought to
itself become the proposed coordinating agency by attempting
in its bill merely to expand its own functions and responsi-
bilities within the public higher education decision-making
network. Thus the BHE bill, H-4482, specifically empowers
the BHE to, in addition to its existing functions, (l) make
additions, deletions and modifications to the annual budget
and capital outlay requests prepared by the public segments,
and (2) prepare a post-audit report of the public institu-
tions and segments for the legislature and the executive
within three months of the close of the fiscal year (McLaughlin
1976 ).
Both the legislature and the executive, however,
were obviously guided by quite different concerns* Speci-
fically, both seem to have been responding more to the reali-
zation that, regardless of economic and/or employment condi-
tions, the end of the period of expansion for public higher
education had already been determined by the hard fact of
declining birthrates; and that what would Increasingly
attend
Involvement In decision-malting for public higher education
would be, not opportunities for the expansion of
political
influence, but rather responsibility for the
inevitable un-
popular decisions on program and facilities
consolidation
and elimination. For both the legislature
and the executive,
then, the proposed centralized coordinating
agency might
reasonably be suggested to have represented
a politically
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acceptable means, not only for Improving the governance of
public higher education in Massachusetts, but also for
diverting the focus of responsibility for the Impending,
politically difficult decisions.
In contrast to the BHE, therefore, both the legis-
lature and the executive seek control only of the nature
and membership of the board which would have directed the
proposed coordinating agency* Thus, the Senate President’s
bill (S-1371) sought the creation of a "College and Univer-
sity System of Massachusetts Board of Trustees", a "super-
board", replacing the five segmental boards of trustees,
but consisting Initially of members elected from those
boards* This last stipulation is generally agreed to have
been intended to assure the control of the proposed board by
persons with whom the legislature still exercised considerable
influence as a result of the basically positive legislative-
segmental relations which had characterized the recent past
period of expansion in public higher education.
Similarly, the executive-authored H-4623 provided
for a "Board of Overseers for Massachusetts
Colleges and
Universities", also a superboard. The function of
this
board, however, was not to have been
governance, but rather
the review of three alternative reorganization
proposals-
includlng the Senate President's model—or.
If necessary,
the recommendation of a plan designed
by the proposed board
Itself. And almost predictably, H-4623
proposed a member-
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ship formula which would assure that the proposed board
would be controlled by persons with whom the executive
exercised considerable influence. Specifically, the bill
provided that 14 of the board's 23 members, including 6
from existing segmental boards of trustees, would be ap-
pointed directly by the governor, and a 15th member would
be the governor's own Secretary for Educational Affairs.
There is no evidence to suggest that the BHE-
sponsored bill to reorganize Massachusetts public higher
education (h-4482) ever received serious legislative con-
sideration. However, neither the executive's bill (H-4623 )i
nor the Senate President's version (S-1371) seem to have
fared any better. While H-4623 was reported out of the
House Education Committee and sent to the Senate side, neither
that bill nor S-1371 was ever reported to the Senate.
Only two reorganization proposals were submitted to
the subsequent legislative session, one (H-5756) again
by the
executive, and another (H-619) on behalf of the BHE. This
time neither bill was reported out of committee.
What has
been submitted from the House to the Senate
Instead Is a
proposal (S-16811) creating a "blue ribbon study
commission"
about what should be done to reorganize
public higher educe-
tion in the Commonwealth.
This, then, has been the data which
now will be con-
sidered in contingencies terms.
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Application: Theory to Data
That power is the consecuenoe of the control of atrat^ir.
contingencies. . ,
According to Clegg ( 1975 )» the contingencies under-
standing of power is derived from Max Weber's concept of
"might". For Weber, power or "might" was the probability
that one actor in a social relationship would be in a posi-
tion to carry out his will. In decision-making terms, then,
power might be considered to be the probability that one
party to an exchange will be in a position to influence the
decision of the other party or parties. Thus, if power in
contingencies terms is the consequence of control of stra-
tegic contingencies, then wherever there Is evidence of the
exercise of power or influence, there should also be able to
be specified oontlngenoies being controlled. In fact, for
each of the decisions described in the preceeding data,
there is substantial evidence of both the exercise of power
or influence, and the control of contingencies from which
that power or influence is specified to be derived.
First of all, in the almost complete lack of serious
legislative consideration accorded the BHE-sponsored re-
organization proposal it Is obvious that the BHE was in no
position to significantly influence decisions on that bill.
This is consistent with the contingencies expectation stated
earlier suggesting that, as a consequence of the fact of Its
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lack of control over any contingencies critical to the
public higher education enterprise, the BHE would not be in
a position to influence decisions affecting that enterprise.
In the legislative determination of both the execu-
tive's bill and the Senate President's plan, however, there
is unmistakable evidence of the exercise of considerable
power i Despite the existence of a general consensus within
the public higher education decision-making network on the
need for reorganization, both measures failed. The contin-
gencies explanation seems reasonable.
In the case of the executive's proposal, while the
executive does control certain contingencies in the legis-
lative process, the contingencies controlled by the Senate
President (e»g.» committee assignments) are demonstrably
more critical to the members of the deliberative body in-
volved. This fact, in conjunction with the fact of the
antagonism which existed at that time between the executive
and the Senate President, accounts for the actions of the
Education Committee allowing the executive's bill to expire.
That is, the decision of the senate committee not to report
the governor's bill is entirely comprehensible as organiza-
tional action reflecting the influence of an agent
controll-
ing contingencies critical to that organization#
The contingencies understanding similarly compre-
of the Senate President's own reorganlza-hends the failure
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tlon proposal to gain Senate approval. In this case,
while the Senate President does control contingencies criti-
cal to the development of a legislative (i,e., political)
career, It Is Increasingly the large* well-organized bar-
gaining groups whloh control the contingency most critical
to the mere existence of a political career—the elections.
And while the Senate President's reorganization plan did
assure—at least Initially—segmental control of the proposed
"superboard"* the centralization Implicit in the plan was
perceived by the professional bargaining associations In-
volved with Massachusetts public higher education as a
direct threat to Institutional autonomy, and consequently
to the labor accords achieved within, and guaranteed by,
that autonomy. The response of these associations to the
Senate President's plan (S-1371) was unequivocal.
In testimony before the Joint Legislative Committee
on Education, the President of the Massachusetts
Society of
Professors (1976) stated.
S-1371 Is a radical document drastically
consolldat-
lng and centralizing public higher education
In
Massachusetts. It Is utterly wlthou reg t
existing Institutions or practices, totally
des ruc
•Mve of campus autonomy--and in effect a massive
transfer of power and responsibility from
educators
onthe scene to the oountlnghouse mentality of
businessmen at the top.
Similarly, the -Proposed Statement by
the Executive Com-
mittee of the Massachusetts Conference
of the AAUP on the
Reorganization of Public Higher Education
(1976) protests
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The tendency of superboards to violate the
principle of institutional autonomy, and their
Intrusion In those concerns of Individual col-
leges and universities that are the traditional
and actual responsibility of faculty, admini-
strators, and the student body—working In
cooperation with local boards—concerns which
keep each institution responsive to the unique
needs of Its constituency*
And finally, a statement by the Division of Government Ser-
vices of the Massachusetts Teachers Association concludes!
Just a cursory reading of S-1371 reveals that
the current re-drafted version is seriously de-
ficient in the protection of professional and
labor rights of faculty. In short, the new
1371 is totally a management document (1976).
At the time of these statements, the MTA alone
claimed to represent faculty at 21 of the state’s 30 public
higher education institutions, and some 63,000 teachers
statewide. Again, the action of the senate committee in
not reporting the Senate President’s proposal is entirely
comprehensible as a reflection of the influence or power
which is the consequence of the control of the election
contingency which these numbers represent.
At this point, It seems reasonable to suggest (1)
that there exists In the public higher education decision-
making network no power which cannot be shown to be
the
consequence of control of contingencies critical to
elements
of that network; and (2) that the contingencies
proposition
suggesting the relation between power and control
seems
therefore to be adequate In Its comprehension
of the data
presented.
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That consensus form the task environment is essential for
the survival of domain . . *
Given the obvious exercise of influence by the pro-
fessional bargaining associations on the reorganization
question* there seems little grounds for challenging the
contingencies contention that consensus from the task en-
vironment is essential for a functional domain. In contin-
gencies terms, the function of the organizational network
is decision-making, and in this case, without the positive
support of the relevant seotor of the task environment, the
network has very simply been unable to effect any decision.
And if further Indication of the necessity for con-
sensus from the task environment is needed, one need only
consider the effects of the decreased popular support and
diminished client demand which public higher education has
experienced over the past several years. It Is this retreat
from exchange with public higher education which constitutes.
In contingencies terms, a withdrawal of consensus,
and which
has necessitated consideration of the difficult
reorganiza-
tion question. Again, the relevant contingencies
proposi-
tion appears adequate t public higher education
does seem to
be unarguably dependent upon Its task
environment for the
consensus necessary merely to function} for, not
only essen-
tial resources In the conventional
sense of the term, out
for validation of organizational
decisions as well.
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That the network form resists change until necessitated
by environmental variation . . .
The entire series of network decisions regarding
the possibility of change implicit in reorganization—from
the various determinations on proposed legislation to the
decision to create a third party commission—seems ample
evidence of the adequacy of the specific contingencies
proposition being considered in this section. The network
has, in fact, effectively resisted change even as It has
publicly acknowledged the necessity of, and committed itself
to, that change. What the data also suggest, however, is a
perhaps clearer understanding of the sense in which the
network form "resists” change.
In the matter of reorganization, there is no evi-
dence to suggest that the network actively resisted or
avoided the Implicit ohange. There Is no evidence to suggest
that the network Is not. In faot, honestly seeking
to effect
ohange. What Is suggested by the data, therefore.
Is that
what resists change In the network Is the very
complexity of
relations—both Intranetwork and between the
network and Its
task environment—in the network form. That Is,
since de-
clslon-making In the network is plural,
and since the valida-
tion of the network domain Is oonsensual,
to is extremely
difficult even to consider a change which
will not adversely
affect some element which controls
contingencies critical to
the network, and which can consequently
block the change
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under consideration. It Is In this sense only, and not In
any active sense, that the network form "resists" change.
It should also be noted that, because in the matter
of reorganization change has not yet occurred, the degree
of environmental variation necessary to effect change cannot
be evaluated in the present study.
tv^e polity will attempt to assure network integrity
•primarily by manipulation of the network environment . » .
In the matter of reorganization, the polity (l.e.,
the executive and the legislature) has attempted to effect
what is felt to be necessary network change by means of
legislation, first of all, to create a "superboard" to im-
prove the governance of public higher education in Massachu-
setts, and more recently, seeking to create a "blue ribblon
study commission" to evaluate the reorganization alternatives.
In fact, both sets of actions are entirely comprehensible
in
contingencies terms as forms of environmental manipulation,
or "manipulated field control".
What must be clearly understood is that the
integrity
of the decision-making network for public higher
education
was seriously threatened by, first of all, the
changes In
environmental conditions which It had recently
begun to ex-
perience, and then, by Its own Inability to
effect a solu-
tion in response to the fact of those
changing conditions.
And what the contingencies understanding
expects Is, again,
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manipulation of the network environment by the polity to
assure the integrity of the network. In fact* both the
effort to create a " superboard", and the effort to appoint
a "blue ribbon planning commission" are understandable as
attempts at manipulated field control.
The establishment of a "superboard" is understand-
able in contingencies terms as an attempt by the polity to
establish in the inter-institutional environment an agency
controlling contingencies sufficiently critical to achieve
institutional compliance* That is* in the superboard the
polity can be understood to be attempting to create a means
of indirectly intervening in Institutional decision-making
for the purpose of achieving from the public higher educa-
tion institutions decisions more reflective of statewide
considerations
•
Similarly, the "blue ribbon study commission" is
understandable in contingencies terms as an attempt by the
polity to establish in the environment of the public
higher
education decision-making network Itself the
potential to
elicit from the network necessary change as
a response.
This is perhaps the clearest Indication of
the power of at
least this particular contingencies
proposition: It Is able
to comprehend In terms of control
organizational action
which must otherwise be viewed as a
forfeiture of control.
And again, the contingencies perspective
must be said to be
adequate.
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Evaluation
To paraphrase Whitehead (1962), a theory Is con-
sidered to be adequate only when every actual or empirical
Instance has the essential characteristics of some element
of the theory* In this sense* the mid-range or contingencies
theory—or at least the fundamental propositions specifically
considered in the present study—does appear to be adequate
in its comprehension of data from Massachusetts public
higher education* That is, every incident from the data
considered has been found to have its theoretical equivalent
in contingencies theory*
Admittedly, this is to suggest nothing more than
that the contingencies model seems to provide an adequate
"ex post facto" description or explanation of decision-
making in Massachusetts public higher education regarding
specifically the question of reorganization. But the possi-
ble criticism that the data selected are atypical might per-
haps be countered by the assertion that the model appears no
less adequate in comprehending the ongoing question of whether
the executive or the legislature will represent the state in
collective bargaining with the various faculty unions. Again,
as with the reorganization question, the contingencies
con-
cepts of control and strategic contingencies seem both
rele-
vant and useful in the comprehension of network
actions.
As Jacob Bronowski has noted, however, in the
current
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scientific society, the adequacy of a theory Is ultimately
determined, not by how well it explains actions and con-
sequences which have already occurred, but rather how well
it indicates the actual consequences of potential actions.
The final consideration of the present study, then, will be
of the potential actions available to public higher educa-
tion in general to achieve the consequences desired.
CHAPTER IV
THEORY TO PRACTICE
For publio higher education In the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, what Is desired Is control of the lnter-
lnstitutional network sufficient to assure the Integrity of
that network during conditions, especially, of low demand
and general resource scarcity. What has been proposed toward
this end, as has been noted, and what contingencies theory
would seem to Indicate, Is the creation of an agency In the
inter-institutional environment with control of contingen-
cies sufficiently critical to the target Institutions to
assure compliance and cooperation. In Massachusetts, as in
public higher education aoross the nation, the proposed
agency has most often taken the statewide coordinating form.
The coordinating agency
The term "coordinating agency" is a general category
including "voluntary association", "coordinating board"
and
"consolidated governing board" as specific forms. In a
relatively recent study by the Carnegie Commission (1971>
p. 26 ), the various forms of the statewide
coordinating
agency were found to be expected to perform the
following
functions:
—Avoid wasteful duplication in programs and
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harmful competition for resources
—Work toward greater efficiency in the use of
scaroe resources
—Aid the orderly growth of all postseoondary
facilities within the state* including con-
sideration of locations for new oampuses
—Assist in developing state policy on admission
of students to higher education
—Collect data for policy determination
—Encourage sufficient diversity within the
system to satisfy the diverse educational
needs of the state
—Serve as a communications agenoy among the
postseoondary education community, the state
government and the public
—Poster excellence in the development of the
variety of programs involved in the expanding
postsecondary education network
Again according to the Carnegie Commission (1971* P*27)»
however, the success of the general coordinating category
in attaining these ends has been considerably less than
complete i
Some states have been relatively successful in
preventing duplication in the establishment of
new programs, but relatively little success has
been experienced in the elimination of existing
duplication. Coordinating agencies have not
exhibited much capacity for increasing diversity,
and have given little but lip service to foster-
ing excellence in the academic programs of the
state. On the other hand, many agencies have
performed well as communicators among postsec-
ondary education, the legislatures and the Public.
However, this communication has been confined to
primarily the needs for resources for expansion
of the network. Although most programs for more
effective use of resources have been limited to
space utilization studies, achieving optimum
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student-teacher ratios and year-round utili-
zation » some have dealt with more fundamental
matters of structure and function in higher
education* Agencies have also experienced
some success in curbing unwise expansion
, in
locating new campuses in urban areas, and in
developing technical programs for community
colleges*
Still, despite such findings of uneven performance
by the general coordinating category, there is a definite
long-term trend toward coordination: In 1940, 33 states had
no mechanism for the coordination of public higher education;
ourrently, only 3 states are without some form of coordina-
tion (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching
1976)* Yet while there is this obvious substantial consen-
sus on the need for coordinating at least public higher
education, there is a Just as apparent diversity of opinion
over exactly which form this coordination should take. Ta-
ble 1 shows the patterns of distribution of the various co-
ordinating forms over the past several decades.
States with: 1939 1949 1959 1964 1969
No formal coordination 33 28 17 11 3
Voluntary coordination
Coordination Boards
Advisory
Regulatory
0
2
(1)
(1)
3
3
(1)
(2)
7
10
(5)
(5)
4
18
(11)
(7)
1
27
(13)
(14)
Consolidated
governing boards 15 16 16
17 19
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The diversity of forms of coordination represented In Table
1 might reasonably be viewed as a function of the problem
of governance in public higher education.
Coordination, governance and autonomy
The problem of governance exists in the conflict between*
on the one hand* the Intent of the polity to assure the in-
tegrity of the public higher education enterprise by attempt-
ing to control the unacceptable institutional impulses toward
competition for funding and duplication of programs, and on
the other, the insistence of existing governing boards on
the continued recognition of the institutional autonomy
which has traditionally been their prerogative.
The contingencies understanding would seem to indi-
cate that to be effective, a coordinating agency must nec-
essarily control functions or contingencies of sufficient
criticality to assure institutional compliance with agency
decisions. Further, the contingencies view would suggest
that, since fiscal adequacy is assumed to be the most criti-
cal contingency for public service institutions, the most
effective way to assure institutional compliance would be
to allocate to the coordinating agency control of some
sig-
nificant function in the budgetary process.
But as Folger (1975. P*23°) explains, to the extent
that It does Include • • oontrol of the
budget, then
coordination borders on governance powers,
since the state
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agency In these cases has effective veto power over the
academic development of institutions." This, then, is the
concern of the public higher education community, not only
in Massachusetts, but nationwide: that coordinating agencies
will develop into "de facto" governance bodies,
• • • too far removed from the subletles and
complexities of local situations to treat each
institution with respect for its unique tra-
ditions, problems and clientele. (Further),
what looks to an outsider like institutional
nationalism and empire building, looks to an
insider like necessary and natural growth, and
is the unavoidable price which must be paid for
dynamic institutions (Berdahl 1971, p*31).
And Berdahl (1971t P«3l) summarizes the feeling of the pro-
ponents of maximum institutional autonomy:
If one wants to cope with diversity, the only
hope is to have many centers of authority and
decision-making, not one. This may lead to
some confusion, competition and a certain amount
of wasteful duplication, but it will be less
wasteful and demoralizing than over-centraliza-
tion.
M.M.Chambers (1976, p.30l), a long-time commentator on higher
education, enthusiastically concurs:
The best modem theory and practice in large-
scale business management now favors decentrali-
zation, involving the loosening of rigid controls
and the delegation of wide discretion to divi-
sions and departments to avoid the well-known
apoplexy at the apex and paralysis at the peri-
phery.
Finally, the recommendations of the Carnegie Commission tend
substantially to support the proponents of institutional
autonomy. In a report titled The Capitol and the Campus
,
the Commission strongly urges that state coordinating
agencies
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--whatever their specific form~should confine themselves
to planning and advising; that they should not manage, ad-
minister or to any substantial degree govern local institu-
tions from the state level:
While recognizing the need for more effective
coordination for postsecondary education at the
state level, the Commission recommends that the
state strongly resist:
!• Investing coordinating agencies with admini-
strative authority, particularly over budget
matters, or
2. Establishing single governing boards, except
in those states in whioh a special combination
of historical factors and present circum-
stances make such agencies more feasible than
other types of coordinating agencies.
A brief review of trends in the form of coordination
established during the recent decades might at first seem to
suggest that the proponents of institutional autonomy are
prevailing in their demands that such agencies be limited,
as suggested by the Carnegie Commission, to planning and
advising. Pflnster (1976, p.l<>5)f for example, notes that
while 18 boards with merely advisory power have been established
since I960, only 5 boards have been established with
governing
powers. Closer examination of the data, however, reveals
considerably greater complexity.
A careful examination of Table 1 above, for
instance,
reveals that while a clear majority of coordinating boards
in 1964 were merely advisory, by 1969 .
the regulatory form
was in the majority. Folger (1975, P-231) confirms
this
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finding:
The history of the last decade indicates that the
"advisory only" form of coordination has usually
been subsequently strengthened. State legisla-
tures and governors expect the state agency to
come to grips with the major problems in higher
education, and if "advice" does not get the Job
done, then the tendency has been to give the
agency increased directing and controlling power.
What emerges from the data is actually a pattern in
whioh the proponents of local autonomy seem able initially
to prevent the allocation of substantial power to the
coordinating agency, which is then invested with necessary
power by the polity as it becomes apparent that substantive
control is necessary to effect real solutions to the problems
in higher education. And it seems reasonable to suggest
that it is because the establishment of statewide coordina-
tion is, in this sense, a developmental process that there
currently exist in the United States alone some 18 sub-
stantially different forms of coordinating higher education
(Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 1976).
Generally, the kind of diversity which currently
exists in the coordination of state higher education in
America would be viewed as valuable for assuring explora-
tion and consideration of a wide range of alternative forms.
Unfortunatley, however, a recent study by the Carnegie
Foundation (19?6, P*8?) concludes:
With all this experimentation by the 5° states,
it cannot yet be shown that any one approach is
superior to any other approach in its impacts .
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There is seemingly no known "quantifiable"
consequence for actual operating results that
can be associated with one or another approach
to centralization of authority . . . not on
any thus fax statistically tested result.
It is not enough, then, for the contingencies model
to indicate that the appropriate action for the end intended
in public higher education would seem to be the establish-
ment of an agency in the interlnstitutlonal environment
with power or control of contingencies sufficient to assure
compliance by the institutions. Lacking adequate empirical
data, what is also needed, is an indication of what form of
control or coordination might be most effective and practica-
ble, given the parameters of the problem of governance.
Coordination in the contingencies understanding
Again, power in the contingencies understanding is
specified as the consequence of the control of contingencies
critical to an enterprise. Because advice has apparently
not been considered critical in public higher education, it
would therefore be expected that the merely advisory coordi-
nating form would not experience power sufficient to assure
or permit implementation of its decisions. The developmental
trend described above—away from the advisory form, and
toward the allocation of regulatory powers—would seem to
affirm this expectation, as would the experience of
the EHE
in Massachusetts.
The consolidated governing coordinating
form, how-
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ever* at least In the contingencies view, would seem to be
similarly unacceptable* Because the process of governance
necessarily direot involvement in institutional decision-
making* the consolidated governing form would not be expec-
ted to be effective* This is primarily because the act of
centralization would produce a level of complexity in the
unit to be governed which would be expected, in contingencies
terms, to deflect and distort actions from the state level.
The validity or accuracy of this expectation would seem to
be affirmed by the fact that states reporting an "effective"
consolidated governing coordination form invariably have
a relatively few institutions to coordinate (Berdahl 1971
»
p*258)
•
What remains is the regulatory form of coordination,
and while there is no clear contingencies recommendation for
this form, Berdahl (1971* P.258) reports:
Most experts seem to favor the coordinating board
(with regulatory powers) over the consolidated
governing board, partly because in states where
institutions are already governed by local or
segmental boards, the regulatory coordinating
board allows more autonomy and is therefore
politically easier to insert into the existing
structure than is a consolidated governing
board which attempts to supercede existing boards.
Thus the simple advantage of the regulatory
coordinating
form as opposed tO
(
consolidated governance Is merely that
the coordinating board Is felt to be politically
more
pract icable
•
There is with the regulatory coordinating form,
however, still the problem of governance. While contin-
gencies understanding on the one hand indicates that power
sufficient to achieve compliance can be assured only through
substantive involvement in the budgetary process, and on the
other suggests that direct involvement in institutional de-
cision-making is not expected to be effective for the reasons
described earlier, experience insists that some degree of
governance from the state level is necessary for effective
problem solving. What becomes necessary, therefore, to assure
a coordinating agency of only the power necessary and suffi-
cient for its function is the possibility of power which is
not the consequence of direct involvement in institutional
decision-making ; the possibility of control over critical
contingencies which is not governance. John G. liuggie de-
scribes the conditions for Just such a possibility.
Governance as rule-definla&
According to Buggle (1975). governance is a problem
in the present context only because it is assumed
to be a
derivative activity. That is, governance is generally
seen
as resulting from, and being Justified by,
the failures or
inadequacies of less controlled conditions. In
fact, sug-
gests Ruggie, free market conditions are
not the consequence
of a lack of Involvement by governance
forces, but rather
have been assured by the actions of
successive governments.
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He concedes that certain governance activities may In fact
be the resultant of an unacceptable Interaction between com-
peting Interests, but he also warns that to limit the under-
standing of governance to merely these activities is simply
unrealistic. As an alternative, Ruggle (1975, p.14?) sug-
gests that governance be understood in terms of a process
by which the rules which structure publicly relevant behavior
come to be defined:
This conception enables us to distinguish between
the "purpose" of governance, the ^instrumental
forms" of governance, and the "institutional ele-
ments" of governance • • • These distinctions are
important because they elucidate exactly what the
govemance-is-derivative view includes and what
it excludes. That view accounts in the main only
for programs and policies (institutional elements)
which it sees as resulting from intergroup compe-
tition. It assumes that the natural setting of
such competition (the instrumental form) is a
market -like structure. Finally, it excludes the
realm of rule definition with which policies ap-
propriate to high levels of complexity must begin.
What this suggests in the current context is that
the institutional elements of governance (l.e., programs and
policies) be left, appropriately enough, at the institutional
level, while the regulatory coordinating agent might then be
expected to experience power as a consequence of controlling
the rule-defining function of governance. In terms of the
participation in the budgetary process which is felt to be
essential for power in a services economy, it might reason-
ably be suggested that the rule-defining function of govern-
ance would involve primarily the construction of the necessary
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budgetary formulas.
Formula-defining as governance
Berdahl (1971> p.122), citing James L. Miller, de-
scribes budget formulas as • • attempts to estimate future
fiscal needs on the basis of certain assumptions about en-
rollments* faculty/student ratios, average teacher salaries,
ratio of instructional expenses to other institutional out-
lays, etc.* (For two examples of the use of budget formulae
see Appendix A.) According to Berdahl (1971* P*123), the
major benefits of the use of formulae for budgeting were
found to include fiscal flexibility, more adequate state
support and more equitable treatment of institutions*
It may seem strange to attribute fiscal flexibility
to a system that calls for maximum objectivity of
data, but the explanation lies in the fact that
formulae and cost analyses are presently used to
formulate "asking budgets", not "spending budgets".
Thus, an institution may be allotted so many dol-
lars on the basis of formulae and other Justifi-
cations and then be left fairly free to spend the
funds where they are most needed.
Significantly, then, the control exercised in the definition
of systemwide formulae is demonstrably indirect* once allo-
cated, the funds Justified by the formulae can be distri-
buted within the various institutions or segments with
only
those constraints normally attending the distribution
of
public funds. At -the same time the potential of
the formula
as an effective means of control is reflected
in the concern
of Institutional representatives reported
by Berdahl (1971,
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p.128), that formulae and coat analyses might actually
"•
• • be used as either active or latent meohanlsms of
control •
"
Thus* control of the rule-defining governance func-
tion of budget formula definition would. In fact, seem to
assure the coordinating agency with the power necessary to
achieve segmental and/or institutional compliance, without
directly intervening in local decisions. However, while
critical decisions in public higher education are generally
assumed to Involve determinations of the budget, there is
another set of decisions which may, in many cases, actually
determine the range of solutions available to the budgetary
process. That set of decisions is the organizational planning
process.
The possibility of planning revisited
In Chapter One, planning was characterized as ". . .
programmatic activity by those in authority, specifically,
the making of choices about who gets what other than what the
market would produce." Planning, in this sense, is decision-
making, and as such, it might reasonably be considered a
form of "governance-is-derivative". In this sense,
planning
has been suggested to be becoming Increasingly
ineffective
for exactly the same reasons as governance in
the limited
sense: i.e., as complexity increases, the
probability of
correctly anticipating the actual outcomes of
the actions
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chosen In planning becomes greatly diminished. Ruggle
(1975)* however, argues that what Is limited la not the
possibility of planning, but rather the terms in which
planning Is understood, and consequently, the criteria
used to determine the success of planning.
As an alternative, Ruggle (1975* p*147) suggests
an understanding of planning In which "• • • the planning
process is Identified with the broader realm of policy for-
mation rather than with particular decision points." Ac-
cording to Ruggle, the purpose of plans, as well as the
success criteria by means of which their effectiveness Is
evaluated, vary systematically depending upon the character
of preferences regarding policy outcomes, and upon beliefs
(understanding) about the cause-effect relations associated
with the plans. In a technique drawn directly from Thomp-
son (1967), he represents the four logical combinations pf
certainty or uncertainty about preferences and causation:
Preferences
Regarding
Outcomes
Uncertain
Source 1 Ruggle (1975* p*l^)*
Enabling by Enabling by
adjustment; inspiration;
Educational test
(
3 ) Participatory (4)
33
Ruggie ( 1975* P* 149) explains:
Much of planning is now assumed to consist of
implementing decisions when knowledge about de-
sired outcomes is certain (cell 1 and cell 2).
Consequently, two kinds of implementation are
now recognized* by computing the "best" solution
where cause-effect knowledge is certain, and by
relying upon judgement where it is not. If
cause-effect knowledge is certain, the evalua-
tion criterion is efficiency, that is, the least
costly means of reaching the goal. Where it is
not certain, instrumental tests are used and the
plan is evaluated on whether it reached the in-
tended goal at all.
Since it is generally conceeded that current levels of so-
cial and organizational complexity all but preclude certainty
about causation (cell l), planning has Increasingly become a
process of implementation by judgement (cell 2), involving
instrumental criteria of success. But as was noted earlier
in this paper, what instrumental criteria consistently have
begun to indicate is a critical lack of success by the
judgemental mode in anticipating the actual outcomes of
actions. And it is to the extent to which both the judge-
mental and the computational modes have been assumed to repre-
sent the full range of the planning activity, that planning
has been felt to have become "impossible".
Ruggie (1975* P*l49) points out, however, that this
is too limited an understanding of plannings
An alternative conception would view planning as
not simply the Implementation of predetermined
policies, but as coordination of expectations and
social knowledge as well. Specifically, should
cause -effect knowledge exist in the absence of
preferences about outcomes (cell 3)» planning
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ought to facilitate mutual adjustment among
competing preferences as well . . . The suc-
cess of planning in this case should then be
measured by how much is learned about problemsin which preferences are uncertain* However
,
should uncertainty characterize both cause-
effect knowledge and preferences about out-
comes (oell 4), the activity ought to inspire
public participation* The success of planning
then would be measured by the quality of the
participation and of the sooial knowledge de-
veloped as a result of participation. It
would be absurd to evaluate the "success" of
planning on the basis of instrumental effi-
ciency in either of these two cases*
For Ruggie, as much as implementation, planning is
a process of enabling* This expanded understanding of plan-
ning is compelling for a number of reasons. First of all,
planning-as-enabling is, by definition, only indirect in-
volvement in institutional decision-making, and is therefore
compatible with contingencies prescriptions. Thus, for
public higher education, planning would refer to the full
range of activities and strategies by means of which the
rules and formulae governing that enterprise would come to
be defined*
Secondly, then, this understanding of planning is
compatible with—even enriohes—the concept of govemance-
as-rule-deflnition* Rule defining, in this sense, becomes
the very process of planning* Consequently, critical plans,
defintions and formulae, rather than being imposed upon the
various institutions, would be expected instead to emerge
from a consensus in whioh the participation of those insti-
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tutions would be essential for success.
Thus, an understanding of planning as social
learning and consensus
-building is compelling in that it
recognizes the necessity of institutional participation for
success in planning, while emphasizing the fact that insti-
tutional autonomy can only be assured by the constant
participation of the institutions in the planning process.
Canadian educator Claude Bissell (1968, p.v):
Autonomy does not depend upon financial inde-
pendence, for in these times, no university . . •
is financially independent. Nor does it depend
upon isolation from politics, which at best is
nervous and unreal, for every university these
days must engage in constant conversations with
those who have been elected to public office.
Autonomy really depends on a broad social
assumption that, despite the exigencies of the
moment, we must not make decisions on Inadequate
information.
Given the reality of competing institutional interests, and
diverse preferences about outcomes, it becomes the responsi-
bility of each institution to honestly and adequately repre-
sent its own perspective, to participate in an ongoing process
of social learning, and to actively seek a consensus which
will assure the equitablllty, if not of outcomes, at least
of the planning process.
Finally, then, this understanding of planning-as-
enabling is compelling because it permits—even requires—
rejection of the "Impossibility" theorem. To the extent
that social learning, Institutional participation
and con-
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sensus building are possible
,
then planning is possible.
And as Increasing social complexity obscures and defies
solution in either the computational or Judgemental sense,
planning as a process of information exchange becomes in-
creasingly oritloal.
SoflolHffEon
Contending that the mid-range or contingencies
understanding of network does, in fact, seem adequately to
comprehend the organizational actions of public higher edu-
cation in Massachusetts, what has been intended in this
final chapter is a consideration of what action would then
be prescribed to assure the effective political management
of that enterprise* What was found to be indicated by the
contingencies model is the establishment in the institu-
tional network of an agency controlling contingencies suf-
ficiently oritloal to assure Institutional compliance.
Given this preference, what was found to be practicable is
the creation of a statewide regulatory coordinating board,
exercising only that power which it experiences as a con-
sequence of its control of the rule-defining function of
governance, specifically, of budget formula definition for
public higher education. Finally, it was suggested that
planning is possible—even critical—as a process of enabling,
i.e*, as a process of social learning, institutional
parti-
cipation and consensus
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This last point Is Important
,
for the assertion
that planning Is no longer possible has serious implications.
To paraphrase Jacob Bronowski (1974), humankind Is nature's
unique experiment to make the rational Intelligence prove
itself sounder than reflex. Acceptance of the impossibility
of planning would mark the end of that experiment. Like
Ruggle, however, Bronowski insists that rational activity is
rarely a function exclusively of the kind of computation
which has come to be identified as planning:
It is not true that we run our lives by any com-
puter scheme of problem solving. The problems of
life sure insoluble in that sense. Instead, we
shape our activities by finding strategies to in-
sure that- what is attractive in the short term Is
weighed in the balance of the ultimate, long-term
satisfactions (1974, p.437 )•
Realization in the present study of the clear possibility
of planning as strategies of enabling, then, merely em-
phasizes the necessity of aligning the organizational under- J
standing of planning with the true nature of human rationality.
Like the human rational process, organizational planning must
be recognized to be, not merely decision-making, but the full
range of possible strategies by means of which organizational
action comes to reflect organizational ends.
APPENDIX. A
TWO EXAMPLES OF FORMULA BUDGET IN t,
APPLIED TO HIGHER EDUCATION
Connecticut
:
Faculty/
Student
ratio
Student
Credit
a) Faoulty Level of
Instruction
Credit Hrs.
Per FTE
Student
Hours/l
Faculty
Position
Faculty
Positions
Lower
Division
Upper
Division
Master’
19.35
11.60
15.5
15.5
300
180
1 aSS’t
Professor
1 Ass ' t/
Associate
Degree
The si
8
7.5 12.0 90 1 ASSOC
Pro fessor
Supervision
Independent
Study — —— 25 1 Full
Professor
b) Nonfaoulty 2 clerical positions for one dean
1 clerical position for one department chairman
1 clerical position for four faculty
1 lab assistant for 60 stations
2. Oklahoma:
After deriving a faoulty salary budget along the lines of those given
above for Connecticut, the Oklahoma institutional budget formulas are
then determined as follows:
a) Budget Base: Faoulty Salaries plus 30$ of faoulty salaries constitute
the Budget Base
b) Organized activities Related to Instruction: 3$ of Budget Base
o) General administration: 7$ of Budget Base
d) General Expenses: 8$ of Budget Base
e) Organized Research: 12$ of Budget Base
f) Extension and Public Service: University of Oklahoma: 14$; Oklahoma
State University: 11$ of Budget Base
g) Library: 8$ of Budget Base
h) Physical Plant: 16$ of Budget Base
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